By Harry DeBoer
Harry DeBoer was a leader of the 1934 Minneapolis General Strike and he spent the next 60 years of his life teaching and agitating for militant unionism. This is the first of two parts of a pamphlet he wrote in 1984. In the first installment, DeBoer makes the case that “nothing has fundamentally changed in the relationship between employer and employee” since the great class battles that built the CIO. In Part 2 he shows how union leaders can activate and mobilize members to fight and win strikes and, in so doing, to rebuild a militant mass working class movement in this country.
Corporations are increasingly taking advantage of workers. Despite huge profits, companies are demanding—and getting—big concessions.
When unions are able to get wage raises, many times the increases are small and don’t keep pace with inflation.
The standard of living is falling. Many workers can barely get by and their debts continue to climb.
Non-unionized workers are especially hard hit. Low paid jobs are proliferating. Without the job protection of unions, unorganized workers face all kinds of attacks on their job conditions. Their hours are cut. They are laid off at the employers’ whim with no seniority rules in force.
A New Mood
It need not be this way. The era of concessions can, must and will come to an end. There’s evidence of a new mood among workers. Unions report that some unorganized workers are asking for organizing drives. They want higher wages, better working conditions and on-the-job protections that come with union membership. One senses a greater desire among rank-and-filers to fight back. Big battles are ahead and I predict a major labor upsurge in the near future. This pamphlet is aimed at the leaders and participants of the battles to come. Strikes can be won.
A strike is always a last resort. That’s how it should be. But these days, unless workers are prepared to strike, employers will not give workers a fair deal at the bargaining table. Workers need to be prepared to withhold their labor in order to obtain a just settlement.
In the past few years, significant strikes have been lost. Workers who walk off the job are replaced by scabs. Major strikes have been broken. Workers have permanently lost their jobs.
This has led some in the labor movement to wrongly conclude that strikes can no longer succeed. They point to the recent defeats and say, “What’s the point of fighting?” As a result, unions have signed contracts with wholesale concessions, even though the employer could afford good wage raises and improved working conditions.
Some unions, fearful of strikes, have resorted to alternative tactics such as public pressure campaigns. Some union leaders have proposed such tactics as a substitute for strikes. But while public pressure campaigns can help, if the employer knows that the union is not prepared to strike, such campaigns have much less chance of success. The employer will squeeze the union dry if he knows the union is not going to strike.
The 1934 Strike was a Model
I have confidence in the new generation of workers. I believe they will begin to turn toward labor militancy in order to achieve a decent standard of living for themselves and their families.
The 1934 truck drivers strike in Minneapolis was a model of how to fight and win. We brought truck traffic to a standstill in the city, we drove the scabs off the streets and we won a decisive victory. We gained union recognition, won our first contract and came away with wage increases and improved conditions.
Strikes in Minneapolis, Toledo and San Francisco in 1934 set off a wave of militant job actions that led the way to the formation of the great unions in this country. Those militant strikes of the 1930’s forged the industrial unions that exist today.
But during the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s, unions became more complacent. The picket line battles of earlier times subsided. Unions set up picket lines, generally expecting them to be honored and they were. But in the late 1970s and the 1980s, that changed.
Employers became more aggressive. They tested the waters and found they could break strikes without too much trouble. Scabbing became more common. Years ago, no one dared cross a picket line. Today, in cities across the nation, workers can recount stories of employers who broke strikes by sending in scabs.
A Brief History of the Strike
There is only one way to win a strike: Shut the operation down. If it is a factory or other business, it cannot operate. If it is a transportation industry, it cannot move. A strike means all work must stop. It means that supervisors cannot be permitted to keep things going. It means scabs must be prevented from taking over the workers’ jobs. Today, a strike cannot be won with a handful of pickets. It requires mass action in the street, led by the striking union.
The 1934 Minneapolis truckers strike was, in reality, three strikes: the coal drivers strike in February, a broader strike in May, and a resumption of the strike in July in which we finally achieved victory. In the coal divers strike, we did not have enough pickets at the beginning of the walkout to successfully close all the yards that were being struck. I organized what became known as cruising pickets. We could picket a gate, and let trucks that were still operating out of the coal yards so police would think the trucks were home free. We’d let the trucks get two or three blocks from the yard, drive up in cars, force the trucks to stop and pour the coal on the street. In several days, virtually all the coal truck driving operations had come to a halt. It was a bitterly cold winter, families and businesses needed coal. The companies caved in and we won.
Farrell Dobbs, another young Teamster leader and myself, were assigned to stay at the union hall in the evenings and sign up new members. They came by the thousands to join our union, Teamster Local 574 (it’s now called Local 544). When workers see a leadership that knows how to fight and win, they will not hesitate to join. The February victory had made our union considerably stronger.
In the May strike, the police recruited several deputies and handed them clubs to drive the strikers off the street. In one incident, some of our pickets were ambushed by police and a number of men and women pickets were beaten badly. We got some sticks in self-defense and, in a major street battle, drove the special deputies off the streets. It became knows as The Battle of Deputy’s Run.
In the July strike, which began after the companies reneged on their agreement with the union, the police open fired on unarmed strikers. Two workers were killed and nearly 60 strikers were wounded, many of them shot in the back.
This brutal attack backfired. Instead of weakening the union, it strengthened the workers’ resolve, and drew even more public support to our side. Finally, in August 1934, the company accepted a settlement, a giant victory for the Teamsters and the entire labor movement. The strike put Minneapolis on the road to becoming a union town, spurring organizing drives throughout the city and state and across the Midwest.
The School Books
The school books today don’t tell much about labor’s story. They have little to say about the rise of unions and the enormous sacrifices of workers in order to make this a better world. The employers would like workers to forget their past.
Indeed, the bosses like to say that things are different now. They contend that the old fighting days are behind us, that militancy is ancient history. Some companies show workers expensive films, touting labor-management cooperation and “quality circle” meetings that encourage workers to meet with managers to solve the company’s problems. Work faster, produce more, and above all don’t fight us—that’s the company’s line.
These employers, with their slick appeals for collaboration, are invariably the same ones who go to the bargaining table to demand concessions and wage freezes from the union.
The truth is that nothing has fundamentally changed in the relationship between employer and employees. The boss is still the boss. Only today, he hires high-priced union busting consultants who coat the union busting message in syrup. “Collaborate with management” are often code words for undermining and breaking the union.
Union leaders should understand the capitalist system. Our leaders in 1934 knew that the profit system drove the business leaders to try to break our union. While the union leadership did not attempt to press its revolutionary perspective on the membership, that perspective—and organization—were important to winning the strike.
What Workers Learned
What workers learned in the 1930’s was that standing together in large numbers, they could beat back the union busters, and win the necessary wage increases and improved conditions. Fifty years later that still applies. Workers today must take a militant stance in order to achieve success. Token picket lines are insufficient. Unions must organize mass picketing with hundreds or thousands of workers to stop any possibility of scabbing. Some union leaders say that’s impossible today. Within a day or two, they argue, the employer will go to court and obtain an injunction to limit the number of pickets to three or four per gate.
My answer: In 1934 we papered the wall with injunctions. The employer can always find some anti-union judge to sign a piece of paper. But strikes come down to a relationship of forces. If our forces are bigger and more powerful than theirs, we will win.
But, if we ignore the injunction and continue to mass picket, the police will arrest us, some union leaders argue.
My answer: So be it. Let them fill the jails to overflow. The union should bail them out and get the mass of workers back on the picket lines, joined by fresh forces that have been angered by the arbitrary actions of the authorities. We must keep the workplace we are striking shut down.
In Part 2, DeBoer talks about how union leaders can overcome passivity of the members and mobilize militant mass actions. Look for Part 2 at LaborLeft Blog in two weeks.
How to Win Strikes is available in pamphlet form, with additional material from the International Workers League, at www.wellreduse.com.
To leave a comment on this article, or on a previous posting, hit “comments” below.
Friday, August 31, 2007
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
Un-accomplishments in a Union Town--Part 3
Madison, Wisconsin, has a reputation as a Union Town. In Part 1 of this series we noted the slow decline in the standard of living of unionized workers in the area and our ineffective efforts to stop that slide. In Part 2 we examine the non-existent organizing. In Part 3 we look at labor’s political work, here in our Union Town
With Friends like These
In his first term, Democratic Party Governor Jim Doyle froze our wages and shifted $65 a month in health insurance costs our families. He refused to support the state AFL-CIO’s universal health care plan, froze in place tax give-aways to corporations and continued one of the most oppressive welfare systems in the country. He contracted out janitorial jobs to an anti-union outfit, killed local minimum wage ordinances and promised to cut 20% of our members’ jobs.
Last fall our union spent an estimated $200,000 to get him re-elected.
This spring, several high-ranking union officials held a series of “listening sessions” across the state, not so much to listen as to sell the idea of adopting the AFL-CIO’s New Alliance model. The presentation included talking points backed up by PowerPoint, complete with maps of the state showing various densities and trend charts.
The problem the New Alliance was intending to address was that we weren’t electing enough Democrats. This, although the presenter noted, labor had experienced some recent successes in that we managed to re-elect the Democratic Party Governor and a Democratic Party majority in the state Senate.
The solution was to divide the state into electoral districts, hire political operatives in areas without functioning labor councils and begin year-round electoral organizing. Timelines were stated in terms of electoral cycles.
With all of the problems facing our movement—falling standard of living of our members, union busting, our inability to organize—the AFL-CIO’s only initiatives in recent years have been designed to elect more Democrats. When called on that from the floor, speakers began substituting “progressives,” “family friendly politicians” or “friends of labor” for the word “Democrats,” and it was noted that the New Alliance model could aid in organizing and strike support work as well. But no one lost the meaning.
How Subordination Works
For the past several years in Wisconsin, labor’s stated number one legislative priority has been universal health care. The state AFL-CIO and its associated think tanks have come up with a sophisticated plan we call Healthy Wisconsin.
But we didn’t hear much about that plan in the months leading up to elections. We could have gotten the plan on a statewide referendum or we could have made labor endorsements contingent on support for the plan. We could have held mass rallies and chained ourselves to the Capitol door. But our number one legislative issue seemed to have been lost, at least until after the elections.
The reason is obvious. Many of the candidates the unions endorsed—and spent millions of dollars and millions of volunteer hours to elect—don’t support the unions political agenda and have long records of screwing working people. If we had made support for labor’s political agenda the test, we wouldn’t have had a candidate for governor.
Or, maybe we would have endorsed Nelson Eisman, a Chief Steward for his union and Green Party candidate for Governor. There was no doubt that Eisman support labor’s stated political agenda.
Eisman seemed genuinely surprised that he didn’t even get an endorsement hearing from labor. But he should have known better. Unions’ COPE committees are tightly controlled by two-carders: people who hold a union membership card and a Democratic Party membership card. And there’s never a question of which card trumps.
Direct Action off the Table
One thing you get from reading the left and international press is that unionists in the rest of the world tend to take direct action in the face of political attacks. When the Indian congress threatened privatization and cutbacks a couple of years ago, 10 million workers staged a 1-day general strike. When the Greek government proposed changes in overtime pay, transportation unions shut the country down. When Berlusconi tried to cut retirement benefits, millions of Italian workers walked off the job. In France, England, Mexico, Ireland, Korea, Iraq…just about everywhere except the U.S., workers respond in the past few years to reactionary government policies with direct action.
[Yes, of course, immigrant workers in the U.S. and their allies staged general strikes on the past two May Days. That will be the subject of an up-coming discussion.]
In the U.S. unions generally respond to political attacks with strongly-worded press releases. Followed by unconditional support for the Democrats.
In 1992-93, the AFL-CIO’s stated number one legislative priority was defeat of NAFTA. But passage of NAFTA was President Bill Clinton’s number one legislative priority. And it was left to his vice president, Al Gore, to line up enough Democratic Party votes to pass it in the Senate.
AFL-CIO President John Sweeney was mad when NAFTA passed. But a couple of years later he was endorsing, (his words) “that great friend of labor Bill Clinton.” Next time around it was that “great friend of Labor” (and NAFTA Senate ramrod) Al Gore. Next time it was the “great friend of labor” (and pro-NAFTA voter) John Kerry.
What if, instead of sending out a strongly-worded press release and then supporting NAFTA supporters, U.S. labor had announced a general strike if the Senate passed NAFTA?
That Which Cannot be Spoken
The obvious response to this sad situation is for labor to form its own political party.
Based on nothing but the material interest of the working class, we could put together a platform that would appeal to organized and unorganized workers, the unemployed, retired people, immigrant workers, women, environmentalists and minorities.
With 400,000 union members as the core and the money we now spend on the Democrats, we could put together a powerful grassroots organization in every legislative district of the state. Such a party could lead the fight for a working class government that would put the Republicans and Democrats out of business.
Perhaps because the need so great, the solution so obvious—and the threat to the status quo so palpable—it is an idea that cannot be spoken in the union halls of this Union Town.
In this 3-part series Un-accomplishments in a Union Town we discussed the inability of unions to defend our standard of living, the lack of organizing and the state of our political work.
Starting in the next edition of LaborLeft we will run a classic 1985 essay entitled How to Win Strikes by long-time labor activists Harry DeBoer. We think his analysis offers some perspective and direction as we consider how to build a militant, mass labor movement here in Madison and across the country.
As always, this project relies on responses from labor activists like you. Click on “comments” and share your ideas with your brothers and sisters. Click on the envelope icon to send this to a fellow union activist.
In solidarity,
Ron Blascoe
Steward AFT 4848
With Friends like These
In his first term, Democratic Party Governor Jim Doyle froze our wages and shifted $65 a month in health insurance costs our families. He refused to support the state AFL-CIO’s universal health care plan, froze in place tax give-aways to corporations and continued one of the most oppressive welfare systems in the country. He contracted out janitorial jobs to an anti-union outfit, killed local minimum wage ordinances and promised to cut 20% of our members’ jobs.
Last fall our union spent an estimated $200,000 to get him re-elected.
This spring, several high-ranking union officials held a series of “listening sessions” across the state, not so much to listen as to sell the idea of adopting the AFL-CIO’s New Alliance model. The presentation included talking points backed up by PowerPoint, complete with maps of the state showing various densities and trend charts.
The problem the New Alliance was intending to address was that we weren’t electing enough Democrats. This, although the presenter noted, labor had experienced some recent successes in that we managed to re-elect the Democratic Party Governor and a Democratic Party majority in the state Senate.
The solution was to divide the state into electoral districts, hire political operatives in areas without functioning labor councils and begin year-round electoral organizing. Timelines were stated in terms of electoral cycles.
With all of the problems facing our movement—falling standard of living of our members, union busting, our inability to organize—the AFL-CIO’s only initiatives in recent years have been designed to elect more Democrats. When called on that from the floor, speakers began substituting “progressives,” “family friendly politicians” or “friends of labor” for the word “Democrats,” and it was noted that the New Alliance model could aid in organizing and strike support work as well. But no one lost the meaning.
How Subordination Works
For the past several years in Wisconsin, labor’s stated number one legislative priority has been universal health care. The state AFL-CIO and its associated think tanks have come up with a sophisticated plan we call Healthy Wisconsin.
But we didn’t hear much about that plan in the months leading up to elections. We could have gotten the plan on a statewide referendum or we could have made labor endorsements contingent on support for the plan. We could have held mass rallies and chained ourselves to the Capitol door. But our number one legislative issue seemed to have been lost, at least until after the elections.
The reason is obvious. Many of the candidates the unions endorsed—and spent millions of dollars and millions of volunteer hours to elect—don’t support the unions political agenda and have long records of screwing working people. If we had made support for labor’s political agenda the test, we wouldn’t have had a candidate for governor.
Or, maybe we would have endorsed Nelson Eisman, a Chief Steward for his union and Green Party candidate for Governor. There was no doubt that Eisman support labor’s stated political agenda.
Eisman seemed genuinely surprised that he didn’t even get an endorsement hearing from labor. But he should have known better. Unions’ COPE committees are tightly controlled by two-carders: people who hold a union membership card and a Democratic Party membership card. And there’s never a question of which card trumps.
Direct Action off the Table
One thing you get from reading the left and international press is that unionists in the rest of the world tend to take direct action in the face of political attacks. When the Indian congress threatened privatization and cutbacks a couple of years ago, 10 million workers staged a 1-day general strike. When the Greek government proposed changes in overtime pay, transportation unions shut the country down. When Berlusconi tried to cut retirement benefits, millions of Italian workers walked off the job. In France, England, Mexico, Ireland, Korea, Iraq…just about everywhere except the U.S., workers respond in the past few years to reactionary government policies with direct action.
[Yes, of course, immigrant workers in the U.S. and their allies staged general strikes on the past two May Days. That will be the subject of an up-coming discussion.]
In the U.S. unions generally respond to political attacks with strongly-worded press releases. Followed by unconditional support for the Democrats.
In 1992-93, the AFL-CIO’s stated number one legislative priority was defeat of NAFTA. But passage of NAFTA was President Bill Clinton’s number one legislative priority. And it was left to his vice president, Al Gore, to line up enough Democratic Party votes to pass it in the Senate.
AFL-CIO President John Sweeney was mad when NAFTA passed. But a couple of years later he was endorsing, (his words) “that great friend of labor Bill Clinton.” Next time around it was that “great friend of Labor” (and NAFTA Senate ramrod) Al Gore. Next time it was the “great friend of labor” (and pro-NAFTA voter) John Kerry.
What if, instead of sending out a strongly-worded press release and then supporting NAFTA supporters, U.S. labor had announced a general strike if the Senate passed NAFTA?
That Which Cannot be Spoken
The obvious response to this sad situation is for labor to form its own political party.
Based on nothing but the material interest of the working class, we could put together a platform that would appeal to organized and unorganized workers, the unemployed, retired people, immigrant workers, women, environmentalists and minorities.
With 400,000 union members as the core and the money we now spend on the Democrats, we could put together a powerful grassroots organization in every legislative district of the state. Such a party could lead the fight for a working class government that would put the Republicans and Democrats out of business.
Perhaps because the need so great, the solution so obvious—and the threat to the status quo so palpable—it is an idea that cannot be spoken in the union halls of this Union Town.
In this 3-part series Un-accomplishments in a Union Town we discussed the inability of unions to defend our standard of living, the lack of organizing and the state of our political work.
Starting in the next edition of LaborLeft we will run a classic 1985 essay entitled How to Win Strikes by long-time labor activists Harry DeBoer. We think his analysis offers some perspective and direction as we consider how to build a militant, mass labor movement here in Madison and across the country.
As always, this project relies on responses from labor activists like you. Click on “comments” and share your ideas with your brothers and sisters. Click on the envelope icon to send this to a fellow union activist.
In solidarity,
Ron Blascoe
Steward AFT 4848
Wednesday, August 8, 2007
Labor Law v. Labor Movement
A number of postings have taken up the fact that US labor laws are anti-labor.
I think that, in normal times, people tend to obey an unjust law not so much because they are fooled into thinking the law is just or even out of fear of punishment but, rather, out of a sense that breaking it would be futile.
But, when people start breaking the unjust law in a big, dramatic way, and when they get away with it and win, others want to join in. It’s that spark that causes a movement to be born. Most everyone knew that Jim Crow was wrong and then Rosa Parks refused to move to the back of the bus. Most everyone knew that scabherding was wrong and then Teamsters Local 574 shut down Minneapolis.
A new labor movement will be born when someone, somewhere, pulls off a big, dramatic militant mass action and scores a clear victory. To paraphrase the t-shirt: If not now, when? If not in Madison, where? If not us, who?
I think that, in normal times, people tend to obey an unjust law not so much because they are fooled into thinking the law is just or even out of fear of punishment but, rather, out of a sense that breaking it would be futile.
But, when people start breaking the unjust law in a big, dramatic way, and when they get away with it and win, others want to join in. It’s that spark that causes a movement to be born. Most everyone knew that Jim Crow was wrong and then Rosa Parks refused to move to the back of the bus. Most everyone knew that scabherding was wrong and then Teamsters Local 574 shut down Minneapolis.
A new labor movement will be born when someone, somewhere, pulls off a big, dramatic militant mass action and scores a clear victory. To paraphrase the t-shirt: If not now, when? If not in Madison, where? If not us, who?
Friday, August 3, 2007
Autopsy of the Whole Foods Union
Throughout 2002-2003, workers at Whole Foods in Madison were engaged in a tough organizing drive and support for that campaign became a major focus of area labor activists. That drive eventually failed and the fledgling union was crushed.
It’s taboo to talk about our losses. Some think it’s demoralizing. Others are concerned that any critique of what went wrong in a campaign will come off as criticism of internationals and local affiliates. So we burry our dead and march on, never learning the lessons of our failures.
But the losing campaign at Whole Foods has some important things to teach us. So, let’s have that discussion.
As a refresher, in the spring and summer of 2002 workers at Whole Foods organized themselves. Wages, benefits and working conditions weren’t all that bad compared to other stores in town. It is worth noting, I think, that a work rule against piercing was one of their initial complaints. Not your average gripes. Worker empowerment seemed to be the overarching demand.
Some of us met with the organizers and offered advice. We told them the company would engage in an anti-union campaign and gave them an idea of what that would look like. That there would be union-busting consultants, captive audience meetings, a company-organized anti-union campaign among co-workers and some of them would probably get fired. I also suggested that they avoid affiliating with an international at this point, at least until they got organized and had some experience running their own affairs. Instead of hooking up with an international, they should reach out to local union activists for assistance.
They listen politely but simply didn’t believe us. Whole Foods management was progressive and green, they said, too cool to engage in old-style union busting. And they had been talking to the United Food and Commercial Workers union, who offered them expertise and legal help.
Of course, by that time Whole Foods had already hired a slick legal firm out of Chicago and they ended up running a textbook union-busting campaign. They stonewalled negotiations, fired union leaders, discriminated against union supporters on the job and eventually organized a decert campaign.
The UFCW’s reputation turned out to be a millstone around the neck of the new union. The union-busters assembled data on the fat salaries of union officials, the cost of dues and the fact that the UFCW contracts in the area weren’t really better than what was already in place at Whole Foods.
The turning point came on November 20, 2002, when the company fired two key organizers. Debbie Rasmussen was working the coffee bar and mistakenly made a latte with soy milk instead of skim milk. Rather than toss it, she gave it to co-worker and fellow union supporter Julie Thayer. It was common practice in the store. But a fink turned them in and both were fired for “theft from the employer.”
It was obvious to everyone who worked there that the only reason these two were fired was because of their union activities. Everyone waited to see what the union would do. Would the boss get away with it?
It was the fork in the road for the campaign. What would the union do?
Some of us argued that, come Saturday morning, we should fill the Whole Foods parking lot with a thousand pickets, demanding that the two be rehired. The lot would eventually be cleared, but we’d come back. We’d be on the news. Some customers would stay away out of solidarity. Others for fear of being tear gassed. Whole Foods business would suffer and we wouldn’t let up until they rehired the union supporters.
The UFCW lawyers told the workers to rely on the law. Mass picketing would bring an Unfair Labor Practice charge against the union. Instead the union filed Unfair Labor Practices charges against the company for the firings. Time passed and eventually the fired workers got a hearing. Of course, the NLRB takes a dim view of “theft from an employer” and upheld the firings.
At that point, the union was all but busted. The company only had to bide its time. Following the consultants’ advice, the company simply wouldn’t agree to anything at the bargaining table. Negotiations dragged on for months and the union had no strategy to force concessions. Workers saw that the union was ineffectual and that it couldn’t win concessions from the boss. That it couldn’t even protect its own leaders from retaliation.
By September 2003, “team members” at the store (the union-busters’ euphemism for the anti-union organization they’d created) petitioned to get rid of the union. The enlightened green capitalist who run Whole Foods announced that “the best way to respect the wishes of our Madison team members is to withdraw recognition from the union.”
The course of the Whole Foods campaign had been predicted from the beginning. But, it didn’t have to be that way. We know how to win. The question is: What will we do next time?
It’s taboo to talk about our losses. Some think it’s demoralizing. Others are concerned that any critique of what went wrong in a campaign will come off as criticism of internationals and local affiliates. So we burry our dead and march on, never learning the lessons of our failures.
But the losing campaign at Whole Foods has some important things to teach us. So, let’s have that discussion.
As a refresher, in the spring and summer of 2002 workers at Whole Foods organized themselves. Wages, benefits and working conditions weren’t all that bad compared to other stores in town. It is worth noting, I think, that a work rule against piercing was one of their initial complaints. Not your average gripes. Worker empowerment seemed to be the overarching demand.
Some of us met with the organizers and offered advice. We told them the company would engage in an anti-union campaign and gave them an idea of what that would look like. That there would be union-busting consultants, captive audience meetings, a company-organized anti-union campaign among co-workers and some of them would probably get fired. I also suggested that they avoid affiliating with an international at this point, at least until they got organized and had some experience running their own affairs. Instead of hooking up with an international, they should reach out to local union activists for assistance.
They listen politely but simply didn’t believe us. Whole Foods management was progressive and green, they said, too cool to engage in old-style union busting. And they had been talking to the United Food and Commercial Workers union, who offered them expertise and legal help.
Of course, by that time Whole Foods had already hired a slick legal firm out of Chicago and they ended up running a textbook union-busting campaign. They stonewalled negotiations, fired union leaders, discriminated against union supporters on the job and eventually organized a decert campaign.
The UFCW’s reputation turned out to be a millstone around the neck of the new union. The union-busters assembled data on the fat salaries of union officials, the cost of dues and the fact that the UFCW contracts in the area weren’t really better than what was already in place at Whole Foods.
The turning point came on November 20, 2002, when the company fired two key organizers. Debbie Rasmussen was working the coffee bar and mistakenly made a latte with soy milk instead of skim milk. Rather than toss it, she gave it to co-worker and fellow union supporter Julie Thayer. It was common practice in the store. But a fink turned them in and both were fired for “theft from the employer.”
It was obvious to everyone who worked there that the only reason these two were fired was because of their union activities. Everyone waited to see what the union would do. Would the boss get away with it?
It was the fork in the road for the campaign. What would the union do?
Some of us argued that, come Saturday morning, we should fill the Whole Foods parking lot with a thousand pickets, demanding that the two be rehired. The lot would eventually be cleared, but we’d come back. We’d be on the news. Some customers would stay away out of solidarity. Others for fear of being tear gassed. Whole Foods business would suffer and we wouldn’t let up until they rehired the union supporters.
The UFCW lawyers told the workers to rely on the law. Mass picketing would bring an Unfair Labor Practice charge against the union. Instead the union filed Unfair Labor Practices charges against the company for the firings. Time passed and eventually the fired workers got a hearing. Of course, the NLRB takes a dim view of “theft from an employer” and upheld the firings.
At that point, the union was all but busted. The company only had to bide its time. Following the consultants’ advice, the company simply wouldn’t agree to anything at the bargaining table. Negotiations dragged on for months and the union had no strategy to force concessions. Workers saw that the union was ineffectual and that it couldn’t win concessions from the boss. That it couldn’t even protect its own leaders from retaliation.
By September 2003, “team members” at the store (the union-busters’ euphemism for the anti-union organization they’d created) petitioned to get rid of the union. The enlightened green capitalist who run Whole Foods announced that “the best way to respect the wishes of our Madison team members is to withdraw recognition from the union.”
The course of the Whole Foods campaign had been predicted from the beginning. But, it didn’t have to be that way. We know how to win. The question is: What will we do next time?
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